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State Judicial Conduct Organizations*
By JEFFREY M. SHAMAN**
I. THE COMMISSION SYSTEM OF REGULATING JUDICIAL
CONDUCT
In 1960, a new movement was initiated when California
became the first state to create a permanent agency charged
with the responsibility of regulating judicial conduct. Since
then, every state, as well as the District of Columbia, has
installed a permanent commission or a board to enforce the
Code of Judicial Conduct or to enforce similar rules governing
the behavior of judges. These organizations have become an
established and an accepted part of government with the func-
tion of ensuring that judges maintain high standards of pro-
fessional conduct.
Although their structure vanes from state to state, all ju-
dicial conduct systems can be divided into two basic groups:
the one-tier commission and the two-tier commission. In a one-
tier system, a panel, typically composed of judges, lawyers,
and non-lawyer representatives of the public, investigates com-
plaints, files and prosecutes formal charges, holds hearings,
makes findings of fact, and either recommends sanctions to the
state's highest court or imposes them itself. The one-tier com-
mission works within the state court system to the extent that
the state supreme court is normally -responsible for'the final
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disposition of cases and usually has de novo review powers. In
a two-tier system, a panel, also usually composed of judges,
attorneys, and public members, investigates complaints and
files and prosecutes formal charges (tier one), while a select
panel of judges or a special court adjudicates the formal charges
and determines their final disposition (tier two). Two-tier sys-
tems operate independently of the state courts, in that they
usually provide for finality at the second tier, thus precluding
state supreme court review
Forty-one states and the District of Columbia have adopted
the one-tier model, while the remaining nine states have opted
for the two-tier system.' There are advantages and disadvan-
tages to both systems. The two-tier system follows a due process
of law model that separates the prosecutorial and the adjudi-
cative function to avoid biased decision-making. By combining
the investigative and the adjudicative functions in a unitary
agency, the one-tier system avoids duplicative work and pro-
vides more promptness, while guarding against bias by leaving
the final disposition of cases to the state supreme court.
Some commentators have suggested that the two-tier system
provides more rigorous discipline by virtue of its independence
from state supreme court review 2 Still, in a two-tier system, as
in a one-tier system, the final disposition of cases is made by
judges or by a combination of judges and attorneys, although
only in the former system do the judges sit on a panel or a
court that is independent of the other courts within the state.
Moreover, in one case, People ex rel. Harrod v Illinois
Courts Commission,3 the independence from state supreme court
review granted in a two-tier system was not inviolate. Harrod
involved a state constitutional provision which stated that the
decisions of the Illinois Courts ComnIussion (a second-tier body)
would be final. Notwithstanding this constitutional mandate of
finality, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that it could review
decisions of the Commission to determine whether the Com-
I. TESITOR & D. Snics, JUDICUAL. CONDUCT ORGANIZATIONS 3 (2d ed. 1980).
2 See Cohn, Comparing One- and Two-Tier Systems, 63 JuDICATURE 244 (1979);
Greenberg, The Illinois "Two-Tier" Judicial Disciplinary System: Five Years and
Counting, 54 Cm.[-]KIENT L. REv 69 (1977).
3 372 N.E.2d 53 (Ill. 1977).
[VOL. 76
CONDUCT OROANIZATIONS
mission had exceeded its constitutional authority This ruling
allowed the supreme court to direct the Commission to expunge
an order suspending a judge from office for prescribing sen-
tences that the Commission had found to be unlawful. It has
been asserted that the Illinois Supreme Court, despite its pro-
testation to the contrary, engaged in a form of appellate review
in Harrod that went to the merits of the Commission's decision
and that thereby contravened the constitutional mandate of
finality 4 On the other hand, it is not uncommon for state
supreme courts to review the supposedly final decisions of
quasi-courts and administrative agencies, such as judicial con-
duct commissions, to ascertain whether they are within lawful
authority While the decision in Harrod remains arguable, it
nevertheless illustrates that exceptions to the mandate of final-
ity in a two-tier system may exist.
The size of judicial conduct commissions varies from state
to state, ranging from a low of five persons to a high of
thirteen. 5 A majority of commissions have either seven or nine
members. In the great majority of states, the commissions are
composed of a combination of judges, lawyers, and non-lawyer
public members. Judges are in the majority on twelve commis-
sions, and public members are in the majority in six. Three
states do not have any non-lawyer public members, and five
states do not require judges to be on their commissions. Two
states specify that their commissions include members of the
legislature.
Ordinarily the judges who serve on commissions are ap-
pointed by the state supreme court or selected through judges'
organizations. 6 The attorneys on commissions typically are ap-
pointed by the governor. In twelve states, the legislature par-
ticipates in either the selection or the approval of some
commission members. In the nine states that have adopted two-
tier systems, the adjudicative body consists entirely of judges
or of a combination of judges and attorneys.
Usually the term of membership on a commission is four
or six years, although on a few commissions it is two or three
4 See Cohn, supra note 2, at 245-46.




years. 7 To ensure continuity, overlapping terms are often util-
ized. In nine states successive terms are prohibited.
All commissions employ staff members to help conduct
their operations. Their staffs usually include a director, attor-
neys, investigators, and other personnel, although a few com-
missions retain attorneys or investigators only as needed.
All state judicial conduct organizations have jurisdiction
over judges of general tnal courts, intermediate appellate courts,
and state supreme courts.8 In two states, Rhode Island and
Kansas, supreme court justices are subject to the authority of
judicial conduct commissions, but only for discipline short of
removal. In some-states, the jurisdiction of conduct orgamza-
tions does not extend to special judges or to judges of limited
jurisdiction, such as elected probate judges, who are subject to
a separate disciplinary system administered by the state supreme
court.
Every judicial conduct organization is authorized to per-
form three basic tunctions: (1) to investigate claims of miscon-
duct and to bring and to prosecute formal charges; (2) to hold
an adjudicative hearing and to make findings of fact; and (3)
to recommend or to order a final disposition.9 The sanctions
that may be ordered or recommended by conduct organizations
include (1) private admonition, reprimand, or censure; (2) pub-
lic reprimand or censure; (3) suspension; (4) mandatory retire-
ment; and (5) removal from office. In some states, the
commissions are also authorized (1) to discipline judges as
attorneys; (2) to assess costs or fines; and (3) to impose limi-
tations or conditions upon the judicial office. Ordinarily sanc-
tions for judicial misconduct are decided on a case-by-case
basis, with the exception of automatic removal for felony con-
victions that have become final.
II. INVESTIGATORY AUTHORITY
Judicial conduct organizations function as investigatory
bodies charged with the responsibility of maintaining account-
7Id.
I Id. at 4.
9 Id. at 12-1S.
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ability of the judiciary They possess extensive, although not
absolute, investigatory authority Typically, judicial conduct
orgamzations are vested with broad subpoena power to inves-
tigate judicial misconduct. Several courts have noted that broad
subpoena authority is essential to the proper discharge of con-
duct orgamzations' investigatory duties. Ordinarily, the sub-
poena power vested in a judicial conduct orgamzation includes
the power to compel testimony of witnesses and the power to
produce books, records, and other material relevant to an
investigation.
Notwithstanding the breadth of the investigatory power
vested in judicial conduct organizations, several limits on this
power have been found. First, a judicial conduct organization's
access to particular subject matter may be restricted by a coun-
tervailing right of privacy or by a privilege of non-disclosure.
Additionally, the specific allegations of misconduct contained
in the formal complaint, which serves as the basis of a judicial
conduct organization's investigation, may often determine the
extent of the inquiry Courts are loathe to, permit unbridled
inquisitions into a judge's affairs for fear of infringing upon
judicial independence. Moreover, a judicial conduct organiza-
tion generally has no authority to investigate a court qua court;
rather its investigatory power is limited to the investigation of
particular individual judges.
Courts use various terminology to describe the substantial
investigatory power that judicial conduct organizations possess.
Because state statutes generally vest judicial conduct organiza-
tions with the power to investigate to the extent they deem
necessary, courts often adopt similarly expansive language in
an effort to give effect to legislative intent. Some courts have
likened the investigatory power of judicial conduct commissions
to the power of grand juries.
In Nichols v Council on Judicial Complaints,0 a bank
challenged the Council's power to subpoena documents relating
to the accounts in a bank held by a judge who was under the
Council's investigation. In support of its petition for a writ to
prohibit the subpoena's enforcement, the bank argued that the
10 615 P.2d 280 (Okla. 1980).
1987-88]
KENTUCKY LAw JouRNAL
Council had no authority to direct a subpoena to anyone other
than a judge because the Council's regulatory authority ex-
tended only to judicial officers.
In rejecting the bank's argument, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court stated that, for the Council to fulfill its statutory purpose
and to best serve the public's interest in the effective and the
expeditious discharge of its duties, the investigatory power of
the Council must be as broad in scope as the power of a grand
jury While the court implied that an inquest into the general
affairs of the bank would exceed the Council's authority, no
indication of such an inquest existed in Nichols. The scope of
the inquiry upon a complaint, the court concluded, need not
be confined to an examination of the judge under investigation
but may extend to an inquiry of other parties concerning the
judge's affairs as well.
The New York Court of Appeals suggested an even more
expansive interpretation of the investigatory power of judicial
conduct organizations. In In re New York State Commission
on Judicial Conduct v Doe," the court considered a challenge
to an extensive subpoena duces tecum of a judge's financial
records. The court held that the Commission acts within the
scope of its authority so long as it is, in good faith, investi-
gating alleged judicial misconduct. Any subpoena issued pur-
suant to this broad authority, the court ruled, is not subject to
challenge.
The federal Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct'
and Disability Act of 198012 has been given a similarly expansive
reading. In In re Petition to Inspect and Copy Grand Jury
Materials, 3 the District Court for the Southern District of
Florida interpreted the Act as manifesting a congressional intent
to vest extensive investigatory power in judicial conduct organ-
izations. Accordingly, the court granted the petition of a federal
judicial investigatory committee for records of a grand jury,
since discharged, that had returned an indictment against a
" 459 N.E.2d 850 (N.Y. 1984).
32 Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (1980) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 331, 332,
372, 604 (1982)). The Act's disciplinary provisions are codified at 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)
(1982).
13 576 F Supp. 1275 (S.D. Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984).
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judge who was under the committee's investigation. In support
of its decision, the court said that Congress had given the
federal investigatory bodies wide latitude to investigate without
limitation as they consider necessary The express grant of
subpoena power was construed by the court as an indication
that Congress meant to grant wide-ranging powers to investi-
gatory bodies to secure the materials needed for a comprehen-
sive investigation. Any contrary construction of the Act, the
court held, "would be wholly inconsistent with its broad pur-
poses-to preserve the integrity of the judiciary, to maintain
public confidence in the judicial process, to protect the wrong-
fully accused, and to strengthen judicial independence."' 4
Despite the expansive language often used to describe the
extent of the investigatory power of judicial conduct organi-
zations, several limitations on that power have been found. In
In re Agerter,15 the Supreme Court of Minnesota recognized
that the investigatory power of a judicial conduct organization
must be balanced against the right of privacy of a judge under
investigation. Noting that a subpoena to testify would not be
enforced when the ensuing inquiry would violate constitutional
rights, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that "a protectable
right of informational privacy depends on a balancing of the
competing interests of the individual in keeping his or her
intimate affairs private and the government's interest in know-
ing what those affairs are when public concerns are involved.' ' 6
In Agerter, the Minnesota Board on Judicial Standards
issued a subpoena directing a judge to appear before the Board
and to testify concerning an alleged drinking problem and an
illicit sexual affair The judge challenged the subpoena on the
ground that it violated his right to pnvacy, and the court ruled
that the judge could be compelled to testify (at least in a
confidential setting) about his drinking habits but could not be
compelled to testify about his sexual activities unless a specific
allegation of publicly-known sexual misconduct by the judge
existed.
Id. at 1279.
" 353 N.W.2d 908 (Minn. 1984).
16 Id. at 913.
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In regard to the judge's alleged alcohol problem, the court
took the position that the judge's right to privacy did not
outweigh the government's interest in obtaining testimony about
a matter of public concern. This was especially so, in the court's
opinion, because the testimony would be given in a confidential
setting. Therefore, any intrusion upon the judge's right to
privacy would be limited.
The court struck a different balance regarding the judge's
sexual activities. The court stated that "[o]ne's private sex life
concerns 'the most intimate of human activities and relation-
ships' " and, therefore, is protected by the fundamental right
of privacy 17 Thus, the judge's interest in keeping his sexual
affairs private outweighed the government's interest in obtain-
ing his testimony about them, even in a confidential setting in
which only a limited intrusion upon privacy would occur The
court further noted that the Board had not alleged any specific
sexual misconduct, and it was not suggested that the judge's
sexual affairs were matters of public knowledge. Either of these
might have amounted to a showing of an important govern-
mental interest in compliance with the subpoena, thereby over-
riding the judge's interest in privacy 11 Thus, it is only when
overriding governmental interests are present that the subpoena
power may be used concerning matters that are protected by
the right of privacy
A judicial conduct organization's investigatory authority
may also be restricted by a privilege of non-disclosure. In In
re Petition of Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board,19 the Illinois
Court of Appeals ruled that the Illinois Inquiry Board's sub-
poena power did not extend to material concerning the evalu-
ation of judges compiled by the Chicago Bar Association. This
case arose when a Chicago newspaper published an article
indicating that the bar association's report on the performance
of judges recommended that nine judges not be retained. The
Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board then directed a subpoena to the
bar association, ordering it to submit all information in its
17 Id. at 914 (quoting Carey v. Population Serv Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977)).
11 Id. at 914-15.
19 471 N.E.2d 601 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
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possession reflecting any and all actual or potential violations
of the Standards of Judicial Conduct.
The privilege of non-disclosure raised by the bar association
and upheld by the Illinois Court of Appeals was based upon
the confidential nature in which the bar association's evalua-
tions were compiled. Since its establishment, the Chicago Bar
Association had conducted judicial evaluations based on con-
fidential responses of practicing lawyers. Members of the com-
mittee that organized the evaluation process were sworn to
secrecy Absent this element of confidentiality, the court noted,
the bar association's useful evaluation process would be im-
paired.
When subpoenaed material is protected by a privilege of
non-disclosure, the government must show a "particularized
need" for the material requested. Mere relevance or usefulness
of the material is insufficient to establish the requisite level of
necessity Rather, the government must show both that it has
a compelling need for the material and that it has previously
conducted a thorough and exhaustive search of alternative
sources and has been unable to obtain the material in question.
In In re Petition of Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board,20 the Board
had neither established its particular need for the material nor
exhausted alternate sources of information. Therefore, the court
of appeals ruled that the subpoena exceeded the Board's inves-
tigative authority.
A judicial conduct orgamzation's investigative authority may
be further limited to the particular subject matter referred to
in the formal complaint that serves as the basis of its investi-
gation. For example, Section 44(2) of New York's Judiciary
Law predicates the initiation of any judicial conduct commis-
sion investigation on the filing of a formal complaint by the
commission administrator. 2' This provision has repeatedly been
interpreted to restrict the subject matter jurisdiction of the state
judicial conduct commission to the particular instances of al-
leged misconduct mentioned in the complaint. In Richter v
State Commission on Judicial Conduct22 and Darrigo v State
20 471 N.E.2d at 601.
21 N.Y. JuD. LAW § 44(2) (McKinney 1983).
- 430 N.Y.S.2d 796 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
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Commission on Judicial Conduct,23 it was twice held in factu-
ally identical cases that a subpoena to testify concerning in-
stances of alleged misconduct not mentioned in the formal
administrator's complaint was unenforceable because, in issuing
such a subpoena, the Commission exceeded its authority
In Richter, the Commission's formal complaint referred to
possible misconduct of a judge who allegedly requested favor-
able treatment on behalf of a defendant charged with a traffic
violation in a particular case. The complaint referred to no
other instances of possible misconduct. Pursuant to that com-
plaint, however, the Commission undertook a preliminary in-
vestigation that uncovered forty-nine other instances in which
it was alleged that the same judge was influenced in his dis-
position of cases pending before him by ex parte communica-
tions. After being requested to appear before a commission
member to testify concerning these additional instances of al-
leged misconduct, the judge sought a writ of prohibition to
restrain the Commission from investigating beyond the single
instance of misconduct alleged in the formal complaint. The
court granted the writ of prohibition, reasoning that the legis-
lature had intended to predicate the Commission's subject mat-
ter jurisdiction on a formal complaint, fearing that "[s]uch
unwarranted and unfettered incursions into our judiciary would
jeopardize its very independence and integrity "24 The com-
plaint "sets the parameters of the investigation," the court
stated, ruling that the Commission exceeded its investigative
authority when it sought the judge's testimony concerning is-
sues not referred to in its formal complaint. 25
In defense of its subpoena in the earlier case of Darrigo,
the Commission contended that the formal complaint based on
a single instance of alleged misconduct served as the basis for
initiating an investigation that led to the discovery of thirty-
eight additional instances of possible misconduct. In Darrigo,
however, the court rejected the Commission's contention, hold-
23 No. 02513-79, slip op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1979), cited in JuDicIAL
DISCIPLM AND DisABiITY DIGEST 279 (Supp. 1979), aff'd, 426 N.Y.S.2d 1006 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1980), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 913 (1980).




ing instead that the legislature's inclusion of the word "com-
plaint" in the Judiciary Law displayed a legislative intent to
utilize the complaint as a legal device circumscribing the areas
of any authorized investigation. 26
While the Richter court, the Darrigo court, and other courts
have granted writs prohibiting judicial conduct commissions
from investigating instances of alleged misconduct not -men-
tioned in the formal complaint that serves as the basis of its
investigation, this limitation on a commission's investigatory
authority is readily avoided by amending a complaint or by
filing additional complaints covering other instances of judicial
misconduct.
The investigatory jurisdiction of judicial conduct organiza-
tions may be further narrowed by the requirement that a com-
mission investigation proceed only following specific allegations
of misconduct by a particular judge. Such a requirement ap-
pears to serve the same purpose as Section 44 of New York's
Judiciary Law by preventing unlimited incursions by a com-
mission into the affairs of the judiciary. This restriction func-
tions in two dimensions. First, by requiring that specific
misconduct be alleged, this rule acts to preclude a general
investigation. Second, the further requirement that an investi-
gation proceed only against a particular judge precludes the
commission from infringing upon the independence of a given
court or a group of judges.
For instance, the California Commission on Judicial Per-
formance is authorized to conduct hearings, to make findings
of fact, and to recommend to the Califorma Supreme Court
that a given judge be censured, removed, or retired by the
bench. In Mosk v Superior Court of Los Angeles County,27
the Califorma Supreme Court interpreted this provision to for-
bid a commission from investigating a court qua court. There-
fore, the court ruled that a judicial commission did not possess
the authority to investigate media allegations that some supreme
court justices had delayed filing controversial opinions until
Darrgo, No. 02513-79, slip op. at 7
- 601 P.2d 1030 (Cal. 1979).
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after their reconfirmation election. Rather, the court held, a
commission inquiry must be limited to alleged instances of
misconduct committed by an individual judge.
To summarize, judicial conduct organizations enjoy broad
investigatory authority To a large extent, the subpoena power
is a commission's primary investigative tool. While recognizing
the breadth of the investigatory power, several courts have
formulated limitations on it. Thus, privacy rights and privileges
of non-disclosure bar access to some materials and testimony
Requirements of formal complaints, the specificity of the in-
vestigations, and the particularity of its subjects serve to narrow
a commission's subject matter jurisdiction. Though commis-
sions generally maintain sufficient power to investigate, these
limitations serve to ensure judges some protection from frivo-
lous or from baseless inquisitions.
III. DISCOVERY, RULES OF EVIDENCE, AND BURDEN OF PROOF
Generally, to be allowed discovery in a civil trial regarding
a certain point or issue, the party seeking discovery must show
that the information sought is relevant and is not privileged
information exempt from discovery 28 In judicial disciplinary
proceedings, however, the standards are different; in fact, the
party seeking discovery often has to show a need for the in-
formation beyond mere relevance.
For example, a judge subject to a disciplinary investigation
cannot discover information based on his unsupported belief
that it exists. This principle was followed in In re Coruzzz, 29
which involved a New Jersey judge who was arrested after
accepting a bribe from an attorney This judge confessed to a
bribery conspiracy and agreed to cooperate with police. He was
convicted of taking a bribe and later removed from office by
a decision of a three judge panel of the New Jersey Supreme
Court, the body responsible for removal proceedings under
New Jersey law 30 On appeal of his removal, the judge main-
tained that some members of the court should be disqualified
See, e.g., FED. R. CIv P 26(b)(1).
29 472 A.2d 546 (N.J. 1984).
1o Id. at 550.
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for participating in his prosecution. No support for this belief
existed, yet the judge sought discovery on the issue.3 1
In rejecting the judge's request for discovery, the court held
that, when discovery is sought from persons holding high of-
fice, there must be at least a showing of the need for and the
relevance of the testimony or the material sought.3 2 The court
went further in its rejection of the judge's claim, holding that
a claim based on the denial of discovery must indicate the
matter that the applicant hopes to develop by the material
sought to be discovered. Here, by contrast, just a general
assertion of involvement in the prosecution existed. 33
Although discovery sought by judges in disciplinary pro-
ceedings is apparently subject to a higher level of need than
discovery in civil trials, the application of the work product
rule is essentially similar. In civil cases, the work product of
an attorney is exempt from discovery unless a substantial need
for the information can be demonstrated. 34 The inner workings
of a judicial commission are also considered work product and
as such are discoverable by an accused judge only upon a
showing of substantial need. In In re Markle,35 a judge was
accused of violating the West Virginia Judicial Code of Ethics
by placing a semiconscious drunken man in a jail cell without
contacting his family or without seeking to place him in a
hospital or a mental health facility The man later killed himself
while in police custody After this incident, the judge was
subjected to a formal disciplinary proceeding. Upon being
charged, the judge sought to discover the investigative report
of the Judicial Investigation Commission. The report contained
a summary of the testimony given by the various witnesses to
the incident.
In rejecting the judge's request for discovery, the court
ruled that to discover factual work product, the party seeking
discovery must show either substantial need or undue hardship
1, Id. at 554.
32 Id. (citing Hyland v. Smollak, 349 A.2d 541 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975),
cert. denied, 364 A.2d 1060 (N.J. 1976)).
3 Id. at 554-55.
34 See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
35 328 S.E.2d 157 (W Va. 1984).
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in discovering the evidence some other way These requirements
can be met when a witness is no longer available or when the
information sought is in the exclusive control of the opposing
party The cost of deposing a witness, standing alone, does not
constitute enough of a hardship to meet these standards; how-
ever, the court did allow the judge to obtain a summary of his
own testimony without a showing of undue hardship.3 6
While the standard of need required to obtain discovery in
a judicial disciplinary proceeding is different from that in a
civil proceeding, there are also limits to the types of material
that are discoverable. For example, internal reports and mem-
oranda of a state judicial commission in preparation for liti-
gation are not discoverable. In In re Owen,37 a New York judge
was accused of granting special treatment and of exhibiting
favoritism in the disposition of cases. The judge, when sub-
jected to a disciplinary proceeding, attempted to discover the
internal reports of the state judicial commission. In rejecting
the judge's request for discovery, the court held that the inter-
nal reports and memoranda of the commission and the notes
of counsel preparing for litigation are work product and are
not discoverable. Furthermore, the stipulation by counsel that
the judge would be provided with copies of evidence expected
to be introduced at trial satisfied the judge's right to discover
material.
Work product limitations are not the only limits to material
discoverable by judges subject to discipline. Procedural limits
to discovery are often contained in the statutes creating judicial
disciplinary bodies. In In re Van Susteren,3 a Wisconsin judge
subject to discipline sought to discover the minutes of the
Wisconsin Judicial Commission's meetings dealing with com-
plaints about the judge as well as the names of persons who
attended those meetings. His request was refused, and the judge
objected. The court, in reviewing the judge's objection, held
that the refusal was proper Only limited discovery is allowed
under the Wisconsin procedural rules. 39 In addition, the Code's
36 Id. at 163-64.
37 413 N.Y.S.2d 815 (Ct. on Jud. 1978); see In re Markle, 328 S.E.2d at 157
3, 262 N.W.2d 133 (Wis. 1978).
39 The Wisconsin Supreme Court promulgated the Wisconsin Code of Ethics in
In re Promulgation of a Code of Ethics, 153 N.W.2d 873 (Wis. 1967).
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procedural rules clearly state that all papers, transcripts, com-
munications, etc., in the proceedings of the Commission before
formal charges have been filed are confidential and not discov-
erable. 40
Connecticut, like Wisconsin, also places limits on access to
investigative files of judicial conduct commissions. A judge has
no right to discover material contained in the investigative files
of the Council on Probate Judicial Conduct. In Council on
Probate Judicial Conduct re Kinsella,41 a probate judge inter-
fered with the maintenance of a woman's estate by making
private rulings contradicting public holdings, by appointing
friends to positions in the estate, by personally reviewing estate
plans, and by other improper conduct. After being subjected
to much criticism, the judge asked to be removed from handling
the estate. When the judge was later subjected to a disciplinary
hearing, he attempted to discover materials contained in the
Council's investigative files.
The court refused the judge's request, holding that the
judge had no right to discover the contents of the files. The
court noted that, under some circumstances, fundamental fair-
ness would require access to the files. In this case, however,
the judge had access to all the information in the files because
the events had taken place in his courtroom. Furthermore, the
judge had access to court records of the proceedings that were
under investigation.
The refusal by some courts and judicial commissions to
allow discovery of material by judges under investigation has
led to claims of due process violations. The decision to grant
discovery or not to grant it, however, in the absence of statu-
tory provisions, is left to the discretion of the trier of fact. In
McCartney v Commission on Judicial Qualifications,42 a Cal-
ifornia judge was accused of "conduct prejudicial to the ad-
ministration of justice" by consulting with his bailiff about
sentencing decisions, by uttering profamties while on the bench,
by insulting his clerk, and by other improper acts. The judge
4 In re Van Susteren, 262 N.W.2d at 137.
11 476 A.2d 1041 (Conn. 1984).
42 526 P.2d 268 (Cal. 1974).
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objected repeatedly to the procedure of the Commission on
Judicial Qualifications, alleging that his due process rights were
violated when the Commission limited his discovery rights to
items other than depositions. The court ruled, however, that
the decision to limit discovery is within the sound discretion of
the Commission. To justify any depositions at all, the judge is
required to show good cause. In this instance, the judge made
no showing of good cause whatsoever, and in fact, he did not
even list the names of the persons whose testimony he sought.
The Michigan courts also have found that placing limits on
the discovery rights of a judge subject to an investigation does
not violate his or her due process rights. In In re Del Rio,43 a
Michigan judge was accused of numerous counts of abusing
his position, of conduct unbecoming a judge, of arranging for
tickets to be fixed, of altering trial schedules, and of other
offenses. After an investigation, the Judicial Tenure Commis-
sion recommended that he be removed from office and enjoined
from holding a judicial position in the future. The judge filed
a complaint, alleging, among other things, that his due process
rights had been violated by the Commission when he was not
allowed discovery during the judicial investigation. The court
found that the judge's due process rights had not been violated.
The provision in Michigan law creating the Commission made
no provision for either pre-hearing or pre-complaint discovery
in judicial fitness proceedings. In addition, the record indicated
that the judge had in fact been allowed discovery during the
hearing, despite the judge's claims that it had been denied. -
Although most discovery disputes arise when the judge sub-
jected to an investigation seeks information as part of his
defense, disputes also occur when discovery is sought from the
judge. A judge who is under investigation is expected to co-
operate with investigators. In In re Jordan,44 a New York judge
was charged with requesting special treatment from other judges
and with failing to cooperate with the Commission on Judicial
Conduct. The judge denied the Commission access to court
.3 256 N.W.2d 727 (Mich. 1977).
47 N.Y.2d xxx (Ct. on Jud.) (opinion for suspension), cited in JUDiCIAL




documents, and he argued that he was entitled to a presentation
of written charges before allowing the records in question to
be examined. The court, however, disagreed with the judge's
position, pointing out that state statutes authorized the Com-
mission to investigate possible cases of judicial misconduct. In
addition, even though the judge was not an attorney, he was
charged with the knowledge of his responsibilities, which in-
cluded cooperating with authorized investigations.
Judges also have opposed discovery in judicial conduct
proceedings on constitutional grounds aside from due process
of law claims. It has been held, however, that a judge may
assert his privilege against deposition and testimony only if the
proceeding is criminal in nature. In McComb v Superior
Court,45 an eighty-two-year-old judge was subjected to an in-
quiry into his fitness as a judge by the California Commission
on Judicial Qualifications. The judge refused to submit to a
deposition and was found in contempt of court. As grounds
for his refusal, the judge asserted his constitutional privilege
not to be called as a witness or to testify in proceedings against
himself. In rejecting the judge's assertion of this privilege, the
court held that, while the privilege did exist in judicial fitness
proceedings, it could be asserted only in a proceeding of a
criminal nature. The judge was being investigated merely to
determine his fitness as a judge; therefore, he could not claim
the privilege against being deposed, and he was required to
comply with the discovery request.
Occasionally parties other than judges oppose discovery on
privilege grounds. In In re Petition of Illinois Judicial Inquiry
Board,46 the Chicago Bar Association issued a report to the
Chief Judge of the Cook County Circuit Court that evaluated
judges who were subject to a retention election. Three judges
whose integrity was questioned were named in a local newspa-
per report, prompting Board attorneys to subpoena all docu-
ments relating to the search.
The Bar Association objected to the subpoena, arguing that
its information was obtained in confidence and that disclosure
41 137 Cal. Rptr. 233 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
6 471 N.E.2d 601 (Il. App. Ct. 1984).
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of the sources of information would destroy the service that
the Bar Association was providing to voters. The court agreed
with this argument, noting that a privilege against disclosure
exists if the communication of information originated in con-
fidence, if confidentiality was essential in maintaining the re-
lationship between the parties, if the relationship was one that
should be fostered, and if the injury to the relationship would
be greater than the benefits of disclosure. 47 The Bar Association
provided a service to voters regarding the fitness of judges;
therefore, the privilege against disclosure was granted.
While there are some instances of discovery disputes in-
volving non-judge parties, most judicial discipline cases involve
discovery disputes by judges under investigation for wrongdo-
ing. The standards that must be met to allow discovery vary
from state to state, but generally these standards appear to be
more stringent than those in civil trials. In addition, judges are
generally allowed discovery only at the times and in the form
allowed by statute. Thus, discovery for a judge under investi-
gation is more limited than discovery that parties enjoy in a
civil suit.
While judicial disciplinary proceedings are unquestionably
of a legal nature, disagreement exists regarding the extent that
the proceedings must comply with the rules of evidence. Some
states are more strict than others in applying the rules of
evidence to judicial conduct proceedings.
The rules of evidence were followed strictly in a Pennsyl-
vania case, In re Dalessandro,48 in which a judge was under
investigation regarding his position as an officer in a family
corporation, his participation in an extra-marital affair, and
his use of automobiles equipped with dealer license plates. The
rules of the Pennsylvania Judicial Inquiry and Review Board
provide that "only legal evidence shall be received, and oral
evidence shall be taken on oath or affirmation." Applying that
provision in Dalessandro, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled
that statements made by a judge to the Board in a private, pre-
hearing meeting were not binding on the judge in a later formal
proceeding.
4 Id. at 603.
"1 397 A.2d 743 (Pa. 1979).
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Although Pennsylvania holds its judicial conduct organi-
zation to the standard rules of evidence, other jurisdictions do
not. Louisiana, for example, has held that the Louisiana Ju-
diciary Commission is not bound by the rules of evidence. In
In re Whttaker,49 a Louisiana judge was charged with using
illegal drugs and intimidating witnesses in his court. The Com-
mission found the judge guilty of the charges and recommended
that he be removed from office.
On appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled that the
Commission was not bound by the technical rules of evidence.
In addition, the court held that evidence of misconduct prior
to entering office was relevant to the proceedings for two
reasons. First, such evidence could be probative in determining
whether improper conduct continued once the judge assumed
his office. Second, such evidence was relevant in determining
the sanction to be imposed.
The consideration of evidence of prior misconduct also has
been disputed by judges. In In re Martin,50 a judge was found
guilty of misconduct for making overt sexual advances towards
two women appearing before im in court and for improperly
hearing a case involving himself. The judge argued that, in
reaching its decision, the North Carolina Commission improp-
erly considered evidence of misconduct from a prior term of
office. To support this proposition, the judge cited several
authorities which indicated that re-election after misconduct is
evidence of public forgiveness of the misconduct.
The court rejected this argument, however, by noting that
North Carolina judges removed for misconduct are no longer
eligible to hold judicial office. In addition, the court noted
that, while re-election may pardon prior acts of misconduct
that were public knowledge, in this instance, the judge's mis-
conduct during the prior term was not public knowledge. There-
fore, the court held, the evidence of misconduct during the
prior term was properly considered by the Commission.
Evidentiary standards, as well as evidentiary rules, are also
a frequent object of dispute. In In re Bennett,5' a judge was
41 463 So. 2d 1291 (La. 1985).
- 275 S.E.2d 412 (N.C. 1981).
5- 483 A.2d 1242 (Md. 1984).
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charged with using his office to benefit a campaign supporter
The Maryland Commission on Judicial Disabilities recom-
mended that the judge be removed from office. The Maryland
Supreme Court analogized this situation to an attorney griev-
ance proceeding in which the standard of evidence is "clear
and convincing." The court also adopted this standard as it
applied to the judge. In addition, the court noted that circum-
stantial evidence is separate from direct evidence, and merely
goes to the total weight of the evidence.
Many of the arguments raised by judges concerning eviden-
tiary matters are not directed at broad policy statements, how-
ever, but at rulings as to the admissibility of certain kinds of
evidence. In In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, Leon,52 a judge
was found guilty by the Florida Judicial Qualifications Com-
mission of engaging in improper ex parte communcations on
several occasions, of selling property for financial gain to close
relatives of parties appearing before him in court, and of re-
sponding untruthfully to inquiries before him.
In his appeal, the judge argued that all of the testimony
admitted into evidence was improper because it was either
confidential or hearsay The court rejected his arguments, not-
ing that the reason for confidentiality no longer existed since
formal charges had been filed. Further, the hearsay testimony
was for identification only and otherwise was not admitted into
evidence. The court also rejected the judge's recantation de-
fense against the perjury, holding that the integrity of the
judicial system is affected by this perjury "Recantation does
not remove the impression that the judge attempted to use the
prestige of his office to influence the outcome of a case pending
in his court and, when discovered, lied about his involve-
ment." 53
Courts have also upheld the discretion of judicial commis-
sions in determining what to admit as evidence. For example,
in State v Tedesco,54 a judge was convicted of falsely certifying
that he had administered an oath to an applicant for a liquor
12 440 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 1983).
S3 Id. at 1269.
14 397 A.2d 1352 (Conn. 1978).
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license. In fact, the judge had administered the oath to a person
claiming to be an agent for the applicant. Testimony by wit-
nesses indicated that the judge may have realized his error after
the application had been signed. The court held that evidence
which is independently probative is not madmissible even though
it may tend to prove the commission of other crimes. Although
allowing such evidence may be prejudicial, the trial court must
determine in its discretion whether such prejudice outweighs
the value of the evidence. The court further stated that, in
determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion,
every reasonable presumption should be made in favor of the
original ruling.
Although most opposition to evidentiary rulings comes from
judges, other parties also raise questions about the admissibility
of materials in judicial discipline cases. For example, in In re
Terry,55 an Indiana judge was subject to a disciplinary hearing
after being charged with several counts of misconduct. A po-
tential witness at the hearing was unable to testify, but this
witness had given testimony at a prior custody hearing unre-
lated to the disciplinary action. The state disciplinary commis-
sion sought to have the former testimony admitted at the hearing
because the judge had had an opportunity to cross-examine the
witness at the earlier hearing. The court, however, disagreed
with the position of the commission. Instead, the court held
that the testimony of the witness was not admissible under the
prior testimony exception to the hearsay rule because the judge,
although present at the custody hearing, had no motive to
develop the testimony by cross-examination.
Although most court rulings have focused on evidence that
was omitted from the proceedings, several court opinions also
have dealt with consideration of evidence after a decision has
been reached. In Spector v Commission on Judicial Conduct,56
a New York judge was accused of improper conduct and nep-
otism for hiring the sons of other judges while these judges
were hiring his relatives. The judicial commission administra-
tor, while arguing motions in connection with consideration of
394 N.E.2d 94 (Ind. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1077 (1980).
418 N.Y.S.2d 565 (N.Y. 1979).
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the sanctions to be imposed, introduced evidence of additional
alleged misconduct. The issues contained in the allegations had
not been raised previously before the commission referee or
included in the charges as originally made. Even though the
administrator gave the judge's attorney notice of his intention
to refer to these allegations, the court held that unproved
charges have absolutely no place in the commission's consid-
eration of sanctions. Sanctions must be based on findings of
fact and conclusions of law drawn from proof m the record;
sanctions cannot be based on unsubstantiated allegations.
In another example of an attempted late addition to the
record, In re Kivett,57 a judge sought to include some papers
originally furnished to the North Carolina Judicial Standards
Commission as part of the record on appeal after he was found
guilty of several counts of misconduct. The court rejected the
judge's request, however, noting that the substance of the
evidence contained in the papers had been introduced as evi-
dence before the Commission by other parties, buf the evidence
had not been considered by the Commission in arriving at its
recommendation. Therefore, the court concluded, the judge
could not have been prejudiced by the absence of the papers.
In addition, fairness required that rebuttal evidence also be
allowed into the record. Accordingly, the judge's request was
denied.
The cases illustrate that there is a fair degree of variety
from state to state in using the rules of evidence in judicial
conduct proceedings. Some states take an extremely pragmatic
approach to this matter, departing from the rules of evidence
whenever it is practical to do so. In fact, it could well be
asserted that some departures from the rules of evidence in
disciplinary proceedings have been unfair to judges accused of
misconduct. In other states, more rigorous adherence to the
rules of evidence has not appreciably weakened the disciplinary
process and has ensured fairness to all concerned parties.
In determining what burden of proof must be met in judicial
conduct proceedings, many courts base their decisions on
whether or not the proceeding is criminal in nature. Most courts
309 S.E.2d 442 (N.C. 1983).
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categorize judicial misconduct proceedings as non-criminal;
therefore, the proceedings need not comply with procedural or
evidentiary requirements of a criminal trial.58 In these jurisdic-
tions, the charges against a judge may be proven by only a
preponderance of the evidence.59 If a court categorizes judicial
misconduct proceedings as quasi-criminal, however, the facts
necessary to prove the misconduct offense must be established
by clear and convincing evidence. 60 Regardless of the standard,
judicial disciplinary bodies act as investigative agencies with
respect to the courts and have the burden to prove their alle-
gations before a full court in a trial of first impression. 61
In Geiler v Commission on Judicial Qualifications,62 the
Supreme Court of California addressed the issue of what bur-
den of proof must be met in inquiries concerning judges. In
this case, the California Commission on Judicial Qualifications
recommended that a judge be censured for using crude and
offensive conduct in public places, and for the indiscreet use
of vulgar, unjudicial, and inappropriate language toward court
personnel and lawyers. The court held that the burden of proof
standard in inquiries concerning judges should be the same
standard used in state bar disciplinary proceedings. In those
proceedings, charges of misconduct must be sustained by con-
vincing proof to a reasonable certainty, and all reasonable
doubts operate in favor of the accused. Consequently, the court
declared the standard of proof in judicial disciplinary proceed-
ings to be proof by evidence clear enough to sustain the charges
to a reasonable certainty
In In re Brown,63 the Supreme Court of Texas adopted the
California Supreme Court's reasoning in the Geiler decision.
The Texas Judicial Qualifications Commission in Brown rec-
ommended that a judge be removed from office. The court
appointed a master who found by a preponderance of the
"1 See infra text accompanying notes 66-82.
19 See, e.g., Geiler v. Comm'n on Judicial Qualifications, 515 P.2d 1, 4 (Cal.
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974); In re Brown, 512 S.W.2d 317, 319-20 (Tex.
1974).
60 See, e.g., In.re Inquiry Concerning Garner, 466 So. 2d 884, 886 (Miss. 1985).
61 See, e.g., In re Ross, 428 A.2d 858, 860 (Me. 1981).
62 515 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1973).
63 512 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. 1974).
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evidence that the judge did not engage in conduct clearly in-
consistent with the proper performance of his judicial duties.
The Commission objected to the finding and filed its objection.
Before evaluating the evidence, the Texas Supreme Court stated
that the Commission's function is not to punish but to maintain
the high quality of the judiciary Consequently, judicial disci-
plinary proceedings are not of a criminal nature. Therefore,
the court ruled, the examiner has the burden to establish the
allegations against the judge by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.
In contrast, the Supreme Court of Mississippi, in its deci-
sion in In re Inquiry Concerning Garner,64 categorized judicial
disciplinary proceedings as quasi-criminal in nature. In this
case, the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance rec-
ommended that a judge be removed from office based on
findings that she failed to report fines and that she used a
highly irregular system of accounts, receipts, reporting, and
check cashing. Prior to considering the evidence presented by
the Commission, the Supreme Court of Mississippi stated that
judicial disciplinary proceedings, like bar disciplinary matters,
are of a quasi-criminal character. As a result, the Commission
had to prove by clear and convincing evidence each fact nec-
essary to prove the occurrence of misconduct.
Regardless of what standard of proof is used in a particular
jurisdiction, a disciplinary body always has the burden to prove
its allegations to a court of law In In re Ross, 65 the Maine
Committee on Judicial Responsibility and Disability filed a
report alleging that a judge engaged in conduct violative of the
Code of Judicial Conduct and recommended that discipline be
imposed. The judge claimed that he was demed due process of
law because the Committee combined its investigative, prose-
cutorial, and adjudicative responsibilities. In an original pro-
ceeding before the Supreme Court of Maine, counsel for the
judge conceded that the Committee had not violated the due
process clause. The court then clarified that the Committee acts
as an investigative agency and is similar to a grand jury in a
466 So. 2d 884 (Miss. 1985).
61 428 A.2d 858 (Me. 1981).
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criminal proceeding. As such, a Committee report is only a
charging document that enumerates allegations regarding a
judge's conduct. In keeping with this function, the Committee
has the burden to prove its allegations before the full court in
a trial of first impression rather than in an appellate proceed-
ing.
The burden of proof to be satisfied in judicial disciplinary
proceedings will vary from state to state depending upon whether
the proceedings are viewed as criminal or as non-criminal in
nature. However, the states are uniform in requiring judicial
disciplinary bodies to prove their allegations before a court in
an original proceeding.
IV. NATURE OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AND DUE
PROCESS OF LAW
It has been argued that judicial disciplinary proceedings
should be considered quasi-crunminal in nature so that accused
judges may be afforded the due process rights that are available
to criminal defendants, such as the right to a jury trial, to
confront- one's accusers, and to refuse to testify Nevertheless,
the majority of courts have rejected this argument. 66 Most
courts take the position that judicial disciplinary proceedings
are neither criminal nor civil in nature, but rather they are sui
generis. 67 Some courts have said that judicial disciplinary pro-
ceedings are not criminal in nature because they do not involve
the imposition of imprisonment or fines. 68 Other courts have
said that judicial conduct proceedings are not criminal because
their purpose is not to punish but to maintain the honor and
dignity of the judiciary and to uphold the administration of
justice for the benefit of the public.69 Judicial disciplinary pro-
See, e.g., In re Hadad, 627 P.2d 221 (Ariz. 1981) (en banc); In re Winton,
350 N.W.2d 337 (Minn. 1984); Board of Chosen Freeholders v. Conda, 396 A.2d 613
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978); In re Van Susteren, 262 N.W.2d 133 (Wis. 1978).
" See, e.g., In re Hadad, 627 P.2d at 223; In re Winton, 350 N.W.2d at 342.
See, e.g., In re Hadad, 627 P.2d at 223; In re Kelly, 238 So. 2d 565 (Fla.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 962 (1970); In re Stone, 574 S.W.2d 369 (Mo. 1978) (en
banc).
'9 See, e.g., In re Diener & Broccolino, 304 A.2d 587 (Md. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 989 (1973); In re Coruzzi, 472 A.2d 546 (N.J. 1984); Sharpe v. State ex rel.




ceedings also have been described as regulatory in nature,70 and
in states that have adopted the two-tier model of judicial con-
duct organizations, 71 it has been said that proceedings in the
first tier, in which no adjudication occurs, are merely investi-
gatory or quasi-administrative.7 2 It should be noted, however,
that a minority of courts do characterize judicial conduct pro-
ceedings as quasi-criminal in nature, and on that basis, require
the application of due process standards.7 3
The most logical and enlightened approach to this question
has been taken by the Supreme Court of Washington. This
court has held that, even though a judicial disciplinary pro-
ceeding is not criminal in nature, certain due process protec-
tions are required because of the potentially severe consequences
to a judge. 74 These include, according to the Washington high
court, the right 1) to notice of the charge and the nature and
the cause of the accusation in writing; 2) to notice, by name,
of the person or persons who brought the complaint; 3) to
appear and to defend in person or by counsel; 4) to testify on
his own behalf; 5) to confront witnesses face to face; 6) to
subpoena witnesses in his own behalf; 7) to be apprised of the
intention to make the matter public; 8) to appear and to argue
orally the merits of the holding of a public hearing; 9) to
prepare and to present a defense; 10) to have a hearing within
a reasonable time; and 11) to appeal. 75
On the other hand, some courts, in rejecting the argument
that judicial disciplinary proceedings are quasi-criminal in na-
ture, have held that judges in discipline cases have no right to
a jury trial, 76 to prior notice,77 to confront one's accusers and
70 See, e.g., In re Hyland, No. ACJC 83-25, slip op. at 14 (N.J. Sept. 25, 1985);
In re Coruzzi, 472 A.2d at 546.
11 See I. TEsrroR & D. SINKS, supra note 1, at 83-85.
72 See, e.g., Keiser v. Bell, 332 F Supp. 608 (D. Pa. 1971); In re Benoit, 487
A.2d 1158 (Me. 1985); In re Cieminski, 270 N.W.2d 321 (N.D. 1978); In re "Judge
Anonymous", 590 P.2d 1181 (Okla. 1978).
7, See, e.g., In re Garner, 466 So. 2d 884 (Miss. 1985); In re Dalessandro, 397
A.2d 743 (Pa. 1979); In re Dandridge, 337 A.2d 885 (Pa. 1975).
74 In re Deming, 736 P.2d 639 (Wash. 1987).
71 Id. at 650.
76 See, e.g., Sharpe, 448 P.2d at 301.
7 See, e.g., In re Stone, 574 S.W.2d at 369.
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to cross-examine adverse witnesses, 78 or to bar an amendment
in the pleadings. 79 These courts have taken the position that
the accused judges should not be allowed the traditional rights
of criminal defendants because the proceedings are not truly
criminal in nature.80
Despite rejecting the notion that judicial disciplinary pro-
ceedings are quasi-criminal in nature, some courts have af-
forded qualified procedural rights to judges. In In re Storte,81
the Supreme Court of Missouri rejected the notion that disci-
plinary proceedings are quasi-criminal and ruled that a judge
is not entitled to notice of a commission investigation against
him. Nevertheless, the court went on to state that, in the future,
the commission would be expected to provide notice to judges.
Similarly, in In re "Judge Anonymous, ", 82 the Supreme Court
of Oklahoma ruled that, although a judge under investigation
by a commission is not entitled to the privileges and immunities
guaranteed a criminal defendant, the judge does have a limited
right to refuse to testify, and he cannot be required to make
incriminating statements. Although the due process rights at-
tendant upon criminal proceedings may not be available in
judicial disciplinary proceedings, other due process rights out-
side of the criminal process may be available.
V PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF JUDGES
The fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law."8 3 Application
of the due process clause involves a two-step analysis: first, it
must be determined if the government action affects an interest
in life, liberty, or property; second, it must be determined what
procedural requirements of due process of law extend to the
interest affected by the government action. Parties often contest
1' See, e.g., In re Sawyer, 594 P.2d 805 (Or. 1979).
71 See, e.g., In re Laughlin, 265 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. 1954).
- Sharpe, 448 P.2d at 301; In re Sawyer, 594 P.2d at 805; In re Laughlin, 265
S.W.2d at 805.
11 574 S.W.2d 369 (Mo. 1978) (en banc).
82 590 P.2d 1181 (Okla. 1978).
" U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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whether the due process clause protects the interest of judges
in their judicial offices, and if so, what procedural process is
required.
Obviously, judicial disciplinary proceedings do not involve
a deprivation-of life; therefore, to invoke the procedural re-
quirements of the due process clause in a judicial disciplinary
proceeding, it must be shown that a property or a liberty
interest is at stake. While property and liberty are broad con-
cepts, the range of interests protected by them is not infinite.
Property interests protected by procedural due process ex-
tend beyond actual possessory rights to real estate and chattels
or money, and the protected interests may include contractual
and intangible interests. However, an abstract need, an abstract
desire, or a unilateral expectation does not suffice to establish
a procedurally protectable property interest. Rather, procedural
protection attaches to claims of entitlement grounded in existing
statutes, rules, regulations, or understandings stemming from
sources independent of the Constitution, such as state law A
unilateral expectation of a benefit does not amount to a prop-
erty interest, but a property interest will be recognized when a
state has acted in such a way as to create an objective, reason-
able expectation of a benefit, such as continued employment.84
Liberty denotes an individual's interest in the enjoyment of
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free persons. When an individ-
ual's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake
because of governmental action, some procedural protections
are essential, at least when some more tangible interest such as
employment is also affected.8 5 Government actions that might
seriously damage an individual's standing and associations in
the community similarly would require some form of proce-
dural due process.16
Once it is established that a due process property or liberty
interest is present, next it must be determined exactly what sort
" See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975);
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972).
85 See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
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of process is due. Due process of law is not a fixed concept; it
is affected by time, place, and circumstances. 87 The specific
procedural protections afforded an individual whose interest is
threatened by government action may vary from situation to
situation.
Courts are divided on the issue of whether judges have a
sufficient interest in their offices to invoke the protection of
the due process clause when disciplinary proceedings are initi-
ated by judicial conduct organizations. The majority of courts
would take the position that judges possess a property or a
liberty interest in the judicial office, 88 and this seems to be the
better view Except for those few judges who serve "at the
pleasure" of some appointing authority, the vast majority of
judges serve for designated terms in which they have a contin-
ued expectation of office that should give rise to a property
interest. Moreover, disciplinary action against a judge can af-
fect not only employment but also reputation and standing in
the community, thus giving rise to a liberty interest.
Nevertheless, some courts have taken the position that judges
enjoy neither a property nor a liberty interest in their judicial
offices. 89 One court has stated as a general proposition that
judges possess neither contractual nor vested interests in their
offices because public offices are created for the benefit of the
public and not the office holder 90 The logic of the court's
rationale, however, is questionable; that judicial offices are
created for the benefit of the public does preclude the possi-
bility that judges have a liberty or a property interest in their
offices. Taken to its logical extreme, this rationale would allow
the summary removal of judges without a good reason.
It also has been held that judicial officers who sit "at the
pleasure" of an appointing authority have neither a property
interest nor a reasonable expectation in the office that is suf-
:7 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
1 Cf. Washington v. Kirksey, 811 F.2d 561 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 96 (1987).
;9 See, e.g., Gruenburg v. Kavanagh, 413 F Supp. 1132 (E.D. Mich. 1976); In
re Del Rio, 256 N.W.2d 727 (Mich. 1977); O'Neil v. Baine, 568 S.W.2d 761 (Mo.
1978).
, See O'Neil, 568 S.W.2d at 786.
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ficient to require due process protection. 91 Accordingly, one
court has ruled that a magistrate may be removed from office
by abolishing his position, even during midterm, if he was
appointed to serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.92
This rationale is debatable because the appointment was for a
designated term of one year; therefore, the appointment was
not entirely at the pleasure of the appointing authority. At any
rate, this decision applies only to those judicial officers whose
appointments are designated to be at the pleasure of an ap-
pointing authority
Several cases also have held that an interim suspension of
a judge does not involve a sufficient employment interest to
require due process protection because temporary suspension
does not amount to a deprivation of a property or a liberty
interest protected by the due process clause.93 While these de-
cisions are probably correct, the reasoning is suspect; that a
deprivation of a liberty or a property interest is temporary
rather than permanent does not nullify the presence of the
interest. The same result could have been reached in these cases
on more acceptable grounds by recognizing the presence of a
due process interest in the judicial office but then holding that
due process does not require a hearing be held prior to a
temporary suspension from office. Due process requirements
vary according to circumstance; therefore, due process may be
satisfied by a subsequent hearing in the case of an interim
suspension from office.
Most courts would hold that removal from judicial office
or other disciplinary action against judges affects either a prop-
erty or a liberty interest protected by the due process clause;
therefore, the removal or the discipline must comply with the
due process requirements.9 4 One noted commentator has stated
that there is "no doubt that a judge, whether elected or ap-
pointed, serving a fixed term of office or an indefinite term,
1, See, e.g., Field v. Boyle, 503 F.2d 774 (7th Cir. 1974).
92 See id.
11 See, e.g., Gruenburg, 413 F Supp. at 1132; In re Del Rio, 256 N.W.2d at
727




has that 'claim of entitlement' to his office which constitutes
a property interest within the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment. '"95 Therefore, the more serious question concerns
what due process requirements are necessary in the judicial
disciplinary process.
A. The Right to Notice
The issue of whether a judge has received sufficient notice
in disciplinary proceedings arises at the investigative and the
adjudicative stages of the review process. When considering
questions of notice during the investigative stage, courts seldom
hold disciplinary bodies to strict compliance with procedural
guidelines. 96 During the investigative stage, however, when the
notice provisions of other agencies of government are at issue,
prescribed notice procedures must be followed. 97 Occasionally,
courts have found violations of procedural due process resulting
from improper notice that arose during adjudication. 98 Most
courts, however, have not been sufficiently sensitive to the need
for notice in judicial disciplinary actions. In fact, in most cases
the courts have been unduly grudging in recognizing any due
process requirements of notice when judges are charged with
misconduct.
In McCartney v Commission on Judicial Qualifications,99
the Califorma Commission recommended that a judge be re-
moved from office. The Commission's decision was based on
an investigation conducted in response to letters from private
citizens and from attorneys alleging improper conduct in a
welfare fraud case. After informal inquiries, a formal investi-
gation, and consideration of a master's report, the Commission
found that the judge had engaged in willful misconduct and
prejudicial conduct.
9, Cohn, The Limited Due Process Rights of Judges in Disciplinary Proceedings,
63 JUDICATURE 232, 233-34 (1979-80).
96 See In re Stone, 574 S.W.2d 369, 372 (Mo. 1978).
7 See Nichols v. Council on Judicial Complaints, 615 P.2d 280, 283-84 (Okla.
1980).
See, e.g., In re Gillard, 260 N.W.2d 562, 563 (Minn. 1977).
526 P.2d 268 (Ca. 1974).
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The judge, in addition to challenging the recommendation
on the merits, objected to the proceedings on the ground that
he was demed due process by the Commission's failure "to
accord him proper notice of its preliminary investigation under
[Commission] rule 904(b)."'10 This rule states that a judge
should be given "a reasonable opportunity in the course of the
preliminary investigation to present such matters as he may
choose." 101 In this case, the Commission notified the judge that
it was charging him with seven general counts of willful mis-
conduct in office and of prejudicial conduct, but it did so only
after the formal preliminary investigation had been completed.
The Supreme Court of California pointed out that the Com-
mission performs no adjudicative function during its investi-
gation; therefore, Commission rule 904 provides more
procedural protection than the due process clause requires. The
court stated further that it would grant relief only if the Com-
mission's deviation from the procedures was deleterious and
resulted in actual prejudice. The court then held that the Com-
mission's failure to inform the judge of the preliminary inves-
tigation did not threaten the fundamental fairness of the
proceedings because the judge failed to prove the existence of
actual prejudice.
The Supreme Court of Missouri relied on the McCartney
ruling in its decision in In re Store.10 2 The Missouri Commis-
sion on Retirement, Removal and Discipline found that a judge
violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and Missouri law by
running a library fund that operated on contributions received
from criminal defendants in exchange for reduced charge dis-
missals or for holdings of nolle prosequi. Based on this con-
clusion, the Commission recommended that the judge be
suspended from office for sixty days without pay
On January 4, 1977, the Commission had sent the judge a
letter of inquiry He responded the following day detailing the
operation of the fund and indicating his willingness to coop-
erate with the Commission. The Commission then issued inter-
,"o Id. at 272.
10, Id. at 273.
102 574 S.W.2d 369 (Mo. 1978).
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rogatories on September 1, 1977, which the judge answered
after requesting one continuance. Subsequently, formal charges
were filed with a hearing set for January 4, 1978.
The judge filed three motions to dismiss the charges com-
plaining of lack of notice of investigation, arguing that the
formal charges did not detail specific violations, and asserting
that the proceedings demed him due process. He pointed out
that the letter he received in January omitted any reference to
an investigation, it did not indicate that the Commission sus-
pected any impropriety, and it was not sent by registered or by
certified mail. He contended that the Commission's violation
of its own procedural rules worked to deprive him of due
process. He maintained that, as a result of these shortcomings,
he had no chance to present relevant material for his defense,
and he also asserted that the court should require strict com-
pliance with procedural requirements because judicial discipli-
nary actions are quasi-penal in nature. 03
In response, the court noted that the procedural rule at
issue had been modeled after the California provision for ju-
dicial disciplinary proceedings. It then cited that portion of the
McCartney opinion which stated that notice of investigation
need not be given as a matter of due process. Consequently,
the judge's complaint that he received "informal notice" could
only be justified by a showing of actual prejudice. Without
prejudice, there was no need to grant relief. The court reiterated
that removal and disciplinary proceedings are not quasi-penal
because their aim is "not to punish criminal conduct but rather
to maintain standards of judicial fitness."'1' 4 Finally, the court
stated that, in the future, the Commission would be expected
to provide judges with notice of the matters at issue in its
investigations to enable judges to present evidence to the Com-
mision before formal charges are made. Consequently, the court
declined to grant relief, despite its disapproval of the failure to
give notice, and limited itself to urging the Commission to
follow the procedures set out in the rules pertaining to disci-
plinary actions.
" Id. at 372-73.
114 Id. at 373.
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In subsequent cases involving possible prejudice resulting
from departures from procedural notice requirements, the courts
have engaged in ad hoc analyses of the particular facts of each
case. In re Kirby'05 is a paradigmatic example. The Minnesota
Board of Judicial Standards requested that a judge be sus-
pended from office pending a final decision on its recommen-
dation that he be permanently removed from office. The Board
served the judge with a statement of allegations referring to his
disposition of traffic cases, his excessive use of alcohol, and
his lack of respect for female attorneys. In reply, the judge
filed a motion asking either for a dismissal or for a more
definite statement of the facts constituting the allegations. The
Board replied that he would receive the facts or the charges
would be dropped. Neither was done. Nonetheless, the Board
later issued formal charges alleging improper disposition of
traffic cases, habitual tardiness, three instances of public in-
toxication, one instance of conducting judicial business after
consuming intoxicants, and instances of discourtesies to female
attorneys, such as calling them "lawyerettes" and asking them
why they did not wear neckties. In response, the judge moved
for a dismissal on the ground that the case violated his "right
to due process of law and fundamental fairness."' 1 6 He claimed
that the Board's neglect in failing to provide him with specific
facts or to inform him of the charges of habitual tardiness
precluded him from answering the charges with any specificity,
violated the Board's own rules, and thereby deprived him of
due process.
Although the court acknowledged that the Board did not
comply with its own procedural regulations concerning notice,
the court held that there was no due process violation. Specif-
ically, the court stated that the allegations of intoxication and
discourtesy "were not so vague as to mislead him or prevent
him from preparing an adequate defense." 0 7 The court refused
to grant a dismissal because the evidence and witnesses pre-
sented to support the tardiness charge were abundant. As a
1- 354 N.W.2d 410 (Minn. 1984).
116 Id. at 413.
101 Id. at 416.
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result, the Board's actions, in the court's opinion, did not
violate the Board's procedural rules to the degree that the
interests of fundamental fairness were compromised.
Although courts have not required judicial disciplinary or-
ganizations to adhere strictly to their own notice procedures,
they have required strict compliance with legislative notice pro-
cedures govermng other areas. In Nichols v Council on Judicial
Complaints,'08 the Oklahoma Council on Judicial Complaints
served a subpoena duces tecum commanding a bank official to
produce data and papers pertaining to the transaction of a
judicial officer currently under investigation. The bank objected
to the subpoena and sought a writ to block its enforcement.
One of the bank's objections to the subpoena hinged on
the Council's failure to comply with Oklahoma's Financial
Privacy Act. The Act stipulates that a subpoena issued to a
financial institution by any government authority should be
served on the customer whose records are affected or should
be mailed to the customer prior to being served on the financial
institution. This notice safeguards the due process rights of
customers by allowing them fourteen days to challenge requests
for access to financial information, an area in which an indi-
vidual can reasonably expect privacy
The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the subpoena had
to be reissued in compliance with the Act if the Council desired
the records; however, the court declined to decide the issue of
whether the judge's due process rights were violated. The court
pointed out that the bank had no standing to invoke protection
of the fifth amendment for the judge as a depositor. The court
based its decision to require strict compliance with the Act's
notice procedures entirely on the Cotincil's violation of the
Act; however, the court's holding cannot be totally divorced
from due process requirements because the portion of the Act
in question was designed to protect the due process rights of
bank customers against unwarranted invasions of privacy Al-
though a request for financial information itself might not
violate the due process clause, it should not be assumed that
1o3 615 P.2d 280 (Okla. 1980).
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procedural irregularities in obtaining the information will be
ignored.
Cases in which the violations of notice occur in the adju-
dicative stage differ only slightly from cases in which the viol-
ations occur in the investigative stage because courts
acknowledge the need to provide a certain degree of notice
during adjudication. In Gruenburg v Kavanagh,10 9 a Michigan
judge filed suit alleging that the proceedings of the Michigan
Judicial Tenure Commission deprived him of due process on
the ground that the factual allegations of the Commission's
complaint were insufficient to allow him to prepare his defense.
He based his due process objection on the Commission's failure
to follow its own procedural rules for disciplinary actions.
The Michigan Supreme Court held that due process calls
for different degrees of procedural protection in each case
based on time, place, and circumstance. In general, the court
found that the Commission had provided enough procedural
protection to ensure due process. The notice that the judge
received in this case contained sufficient facts and was timed
so that the judge had an ample chance to respond to the
complaint and to the petition for interim suspension.
As in investigative matters, there must be a showing of
actual prejudice in adjudicative matters to grant relief. In re
Robson110 was a suit instituted by an Alaskan judge after the
Alaska Commission on Judicial Qualifications recommended
that he be censured for his conduct. The judge conceded that
he was not prejudiced by the pre-hearing irregularities, and he
stated that his purpose in bringing suit was to clarify the proper
procedures in Commission proceedings. Although the Alaska
Supreme Court did nct mention the type or the quality of
notice given, the court stated that the Commission gave the
judge adequate notice of the charges and a reasonable oppor-
tunity to be heard. Moreover, it cautioned that, even if the
Commission operated without any procedural rules or if it
neglected to follow established rules, that alone would not
indicate a per se violation of the due process clause. The judge
,o9 413 F Supp. 1132 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
11 500 P.2d 657 (Alaska 1972).
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admittedly could not prove that the Commission's action re-
sulted in actual prejudice; therefore, no relief was granted.
When complaints have alleged that the verbal expression of
the charged violations were inadequate to provide proper no-
tice, courts have given wide latitude to disciplinary bodies. The
Supreme Court of Indiana decided whether a complaint filed
by the state Disciplinary Commission gave a judge sufficient
notice to satisfy the due process clause in In re Wireman.111
The complaint alleged seven counts of misconduct by combin-
ing the functions of an attorney with the role of a judicial
officer The Commission urged that the judge be disbarred as
an attorney The judge claimed that the wording of the griev-
ance did not comport with the requirements of Indiana's Ad-
mission and Discipline Rule 23, section 10(a)(2). That section
states that grievances should contain allegations of misconduct
following the Code of Professional Responsibility In this case,
the Commission worded its complaint according to the terms
of the Judicial Canons. The judge asserted that this departure
from established procedure demed him due process with regard
to those charges based on the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility
The court sided with the Commission, observing that "it
would be absurd to hold that the grievance must be strictly
construed [because the] vast majority of grievances are
filed by persons not skilled in the law "112 It Is for this reason
that the Commission reviews grievances, dismisses baseless
complaints, and then frames a complaint that avers the alleged
misconduct in the proper form. In this case, the court found
that the wording did not prevent the judge from understanding
the substance of the charges. Accordingly, the court held that
the notice given to the judge satisfied the spirit, if not the
letter, of the rule at issue; therefore, the notice did not result
in a denial of due process of law
Despite all of the allowances courts have made for discipli-
nary bodies in adjudication proceedings, they have not tolerated
a total absence of notice. In In re Gillard,1" 3 the Lawyers
" 367 N.E.2d 1368 (Ind. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 904 (1978).
12 Id. at 1369 (quoting In re Murray, 362 N.E.2d 128, 130 (Ind. 1977)).
1,3 260 N.W.2d 562 (Minn. 1977).
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Professional Responsibility Board began proceedings against a
judge on the strength of allegations of professional misconduct.
The Minnesota Supreme Court asked the state Board on Judi-
cial Standards to file a brief on the subject. Thereafter, the
Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board filed a petition rec-
ommending disbarment, and the court appointed a referee who
conducted hearings and agreed that disbarment was warranted.
The Board on Judicial Standards took the position that, if the
judge was disbarred, he should be removed from his judicial
office.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota declined to act on the
referee's recommendations because it found that the judge did
not receive adequate notice or a chance to be heard regarding
his fitness to retain his office. Consequently, the court decided
to place the matter in the hands of the Board on Judicial
Standards with the expectation that the judge be afforded all
the procedural rights under state statutes and the Rules of the
Board on Judicial Standards; however, the court did allow the
Board on Judicial Standards to consider, along with all the
other appropriate evidence, the findings and the conclusions of
the referee.
Recently, in In re Deming,11 4 the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington stated that, because of the potentially severe conse-
quences to a judge in a disciplinary proceeding, certain due
process protections are required, including written notice of the
charge, of the nature and the cause of the accusation, and of
the name of the person or the persons who brought the com-
plaint. In contrast, most courts usually have not allowed errors
in prescribed notice procedures to nullify the validity of inves-
tigations and hearings conducted by disciplinary orgamzations.
Most courts have held that virtually no notice is required by
the due process clause in investigatory proceedings. In adjudi-
cative proceedings, due process demands only the notice that
is necessary to give the judge a general idea of the charges
against um. That the courts have taken such a parsimomous
view of the due process notice requirements is distressing, es-
11 736 P.2d 639 (Wash. 1987).
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pecially in allowing commissions to violate their own rules of
notice.
B. The Right to Counsel
Courts have recognized that the right to counsel in judicial
disciplinary proceedings is an essential element of due proc-
ess."15 Most courts agree that a judicial disciplinary proceeding
is subject to the same rights and restrictions concerning the
benefit of counsel as any other proceeding that threatens to
deprive a person of a livelihood or a good reputation. "Since
disqualification [from office] is a serious penalty it can be
constitutionally imposed only when the adjudication of guilt
meets the fundamental requirements of due process." 6 Due
process includes the right to counsel." 7 Some courts have ex-
plained that, because judicial disciplinary proceedings are quasi-
criminal in nature, a judge is entitled to the due process right
to be represented by counsel." 8 Whatever the reasoning, courts
agree that judges have a right to counsel in judicial conduct
proceedings.
The right to counsel in a judicial conduct proceeding may
be waived or lost. In one case," 9 for example, it was held not
to violate the due process clause when a commission refused to
grant a continuance to a non-lawyer judge who had retained
counsel with a conflicting court engagement on the date set for
the judge's misconduct hearing. In denying the accused judge's
request for a continuance, the Commission forced the judge to
proceed in a hearing without representation by counsel. Nev-
ertheless, it was held that the Commission had not denied the
judge the right of counsel; rather the judge gave.up his own
right to counsel by knowingly selecting an attorney who had a
conflicting court engagement.
"I See, e.g., In re Kelly, 238 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 962
(1970); In re Haggerty, 241 So. 2d 469 (La. 1970); In re Peoples, 250 S.E.2d 890
(N.C. 1976), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929 (1978).
116 In re Peoples, 250 S.E.2d at 923.
"1 See, e.g., id.
"I See, e.g., In re Haggerty, 241 So. 2d at 469.
19 In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge (Taunton), 357 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1978)_
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While the right to counsel ordinarily includes the right to
obtain an attorney of one's own choice, this right is not ab-
solute. Thus, it has been held that an accused judge does not
have the right to be represented by her lawyer-husband who
was also a witness and, therefore, disqualified under the Code
of Professional Responsibility from representing a party in the
proceeding. In the court's opinion, the judge demonstrated no
showing of prejudice by the fact that she could not be repre-
sented by her husband, and the court ordered her to retain
other counsel.120
Although the right to counsel may be waived or lost, the
courts are virtually uniform in their agreement that the right
to counsel applies to the judicial conduct process. Many courts
have held that the right to be represented by counsel in a
judicial disciplinary proceeding is an aspect of fundamental
fairness protected by the due process clause.12 1
C. The Right to Confront and to Cross-Examine Witnesses
It has been held that, during the investigative stage of
judicial disciplinary proceedings, there is no right to confront
and to cross-examine witnesses, or even to be present while
they are questioned. 2 2 Even during the adjudicative stage of
the proceedings, several courts have held that, because disci-
plinary proceedings are not criminal in nature, no right to
confront one's accusers exists. 23 In fact, several courts have
held that a judge has no right to know the identity of the
person who filed a complaint against him or her 124 Some courts
have said that the party filing a complaint against a judge is
unlike a victim charging someone with a criminal offense be-
cause, in the disciplinary process, a commission has the re-
120 Sims v. New York State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 441 N.Y.S.2d 806
(N.Y 1981).
2I See, e.g., In re Haggerty, 241 So. 2d at 469.
'2z See, e.g., In re Whitaker, 463 So. 2d 1291 (La. 1985); In re Troy, 306 N.E.2d
203 (Mass. 1973).
"I3 See, e.g., Keiser v, Bell, 332 F Supp. 608 (E.D. Pa. 1971); In re Wireman,
367 N.E,2d at 1368; In re Mills, 539 S.W.2d 447 (Mo. 1976).
124 See, e.g., In re Wireman, 367 N.E.2d at 1 68, cert. denied, 436 US. 904
(1977); In re Daniels, 340 So. 2d 301 (La, 1976),
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sponsibility of making an independent judgment of misconduct;
the commision, rather than the grievant, acts as the complain-
ant.125
Still, the better view, and the one followed by some courts,
is that disciplinary proceedings can penalize a judge seriously
Therefore, during the adjudicative stage the fundamental re-
quirements of due process, including the right to confront and
to cross-examine witnesses, must be met.1 26
D Combining Investigative and Adjudicative Functions in
One Body
It is well-settled that an impartial adjudicator is an essential
element of due process. 27 Therefore, a question may be raised
as to whether a judicial conduct organization that possesses the
combined authority to investigate and to adjudicate cases vio-
lates the due process clause. Some have argued that a body
which investigates matters cannot be an impartial adjudicator
of those same matters. Nonetheless, a considerable amount of
opinion holds that the mere combination of investigative and
adjudicative authority into a single administrative agency does
not run afoul of due process standards. 28 Rather, courts con-
sistently take a pragmatic position concerning this matter by
requiring proof that the combination of functions has produced
actual bias which is sufficient to overcome a presumption of
fairness and integrity in adjudicators. 29
In the nine jurisdictions that employ the two-tier model of
judicial discipline, the investigative and the adjudicative func-
tions are separated to ensure the highest degree of impartiality
In the remaining jurisdictions, where the functions are com-
bined, the courts have been unwilling to assume that the req-
uisite degree of impartiality is not present. Some of these courts
are perhaps sensitive to the fact that such a structural charac-
,", See, e.g., In re Wireman, 67 N.E.2d at 1368; In re Daniels, 340 So. 2d at
301.
116 See, e.g., In re Haggerty, 241 So. 2d at 469; In re Peoples, 250 S.E.2d at
890.
," See, e.g., In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1965).




teristic may enhance the likelihood of actual bias, but they are
unwilling to assume actual bias in all cases. Therefore, these
courts emphasize that the adjudicative functions of some ju-
dicial conduct organizations amount to no more than a rec-
ommendation to a state supreme court to discipline a judge.
Even in those states where judicial conduct organizations are
vested with actual disciplinary power, however, due process
challenges to the combined functions of the organizations have
failed.
In the seminal case of Keiser v Bell, 130 a federal District
Court considered a judge's contention that his due process
rights were violated by the involvement of the Executive Sec-
retary of the Pennsylvania Judicial Inquiry and Review Board
in the prosecutorial, the fact-finding, and the adjudicative stages
of the disciplinary proceedings. Specifically, the Executive Sec-
retary had executed one of two affidavits to verify the com-
plaint filed against the judge. In his affidavit, the Executive
Secretary swore that the facts set forth in the complaint were
true and correct. Thereafter, the Executive Secretary partici-
pated in the Board's fact-finding committee and in the for-
mulation of the Judicial Board's recommendation that the judge
be removed from judicial office.
The court found no violation of the due process clause. In
the court's opinion, the determination made by the Board was
not a final adjudication but was only a recommendation subject
to approval or rejection by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
Therefore, a clear separation between the preliminary investi-
gation of the complaint and the state Supreme Court's final
adjudication existed. The court also held that the judge's due
process challenge must fail because there was neither an alle-
gation nor any evidence to show that the signing of the affidavit
in support of the complaint affected the fact-finding committee
or prejudiced the Board's adjudication. In other words, there
was no showing of actual bias; therefore, no violation of the
due process clause existed.
In Roy v Jones,3 ' several justices of the peace sought to
enjoin the Pennsylvania Judicial Inquiry and Review Board
11o 332 F Supp. 608 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
M 349 F Supp. 315 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
[VOL. 76
CONDUCT ORGANIZATIONS
from conducting hearings and making further recommendations
in their cases. They alleged that the Board could not remain
impartial because it had previously recommended that the plain-
tiffs be suspended from their offices pending final adjudication
in the disciplinary actions against them. Additionally, these
plaintiffs contended that the functiomng of the Board as a
prosecutor, as a judge, and as a jury violated their due process
right. These arguments were summarily rejected on the ground
that they were unaccompamed by a showing of actual bias.
Since Keiser, courts have umformly rejected due process
challenges to the combination of investigatory and adjudicatory
functions in judicial conduct organizations. In In re Brown,132
the Texas high court rejected a judge's due process contention
against combined functions, summarily noting that the same
argument "had been considered and rejected in the context of
federal administrative agencies and their investigatory-adjudi-
catory roles. ' 133 In Brown, the Commission had designated an
assistant attorney general as an examiner to conduct the actual
investigation of the alleged misconduct and to present evidence
before the Commission. 34 Such an arrangement is clearly less
offensive to the separation of functions principle than the ar-
rangements in Keiser or in Roy
In some states with one-tier commissions, once an investi-
gation is complete, a commission may reject the accusations
against the judge, may issue a private reprimand, may issue a
public censure of the judge, or may recommend to the state
supreme court the removal of the judge. It has been asserted
that the latter two options implicate a judge's due process
interests, and removal from office clearly would require pro-
cedural due process protections. 35 When a judicial commission
recommends removal from office, however, the recommenda-
tion does not amount to removal of the judge in and of itself.
Rather, the ultimate authority to remove the judge rests exclu-
sively with the state supreme court.1 36 Therefore, even when a
1 512 S.W.2d 317 (rex. 1974).
33 Id. at 321.
" Id. at 325 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
131 See supra text accompanying notes 83-95.
"I See, e.g., Keiser, 332 F Supp. at 608; Brown, 512 S.W.2d at 317.
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judicial commission recommends removal, it is not certain that
procedural due process protections are necessary
In In re Hanson,'13 7 the Alaska Supreme Court rejected a
judge's due process challenge to Alaska's Judicial Commission
Rule 5(a) which authorizes the Commission to determine whether
allegations of misconduct are frivolous or unfounded and to
determine whether formal proceedings should be instituted and
a hearing held. The court ruled that the Commission's dual
investigative and adjudicative functions "did not result in a
biased or partial tribunal."' 38 The court was influenced by the
fact that exclusive adjudicatory authority to suspend, to re-
move, to retire, or even to censure a judge was vested in the
state supreme court.
In Nicholson v Judicial Retirement and Removal Commis-
sion,3 9 the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that the mere com-
bination of functions did not violate the judge's due process
rights when the Commission investigated alleged misconduct,
instituted formal proceedings, and issued a public censure after
conducting an evidentiary hearing. Relying on precedent, the
court rejected the judge's contention that the procedures led to
a biased trier of fact. Rather, the court found that "this case
did not present a situation where common sense dictates that
the investigative and adjudicative roles must be played by dif-
ferent persons in order to avoid inevitable bias.' ' 40 In the
court's opinion, the judge failed to overcome the assumption
of honesty and integrity of the Commission members.
A few cases do exist in which a judge attempted to show
actual bias rather than per se bias. In Halleck v Berliner,141
the judge alleged that the Judicial Commission Chairman was
actually biased against the judge because, nine years earlier,
the Chairman was an Assistant United States Attorney, and the
judge had been critical of a policy of the United States Attor-
ney's office. Nevertheless, the court held that the evidence did
not establish that the judge had a valid claim against the
,37 532 P.2d 303 (Alaska 1975).
"M Id. at 306.
139 562 S.W.2d 306 (Ky. 1978).
,4o Id. at 309.
14 427 F Supp. 1225 (D.D.C. 1977).
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Chairman based on bias. In Roy, it was suggested that in order
to be disqualifying, actual bias "must stem from an extraju-
dicial source and must result in an opinion on the merits on
some basis other than what the judge learned from his partic-
ipation in the case." 142 A personal or a financial interest held
by the adjudicator or the existence of a personal affront di-
rected at the adjudicator are examples of disqualifying actual
bias mentioned by the court.
E. The Right Against Self-Incrimination
Several courts have held that there is no blanket fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination in judicial conduct
proceedings. These courts have taken the position that a judge
may not refuse to take the stand or to testify because the
proceedings are not criminal in nature. 143 In disciplinary pro-
ceedings, however, a judge may assert a fifth amendment right
not to answer particular questions if the answers would incrim-
inate the judge. This right applies only to questions of an
incriminating nature and may be overcome by granting the
judge immunity from criminal prosecution. A judge has no
right to refuse to answer nonincriminating questions which
show that he or she has violated the code of ethics.1
44
In In re Glancey, 45 the court held that the fifth amendment
right against self-incrimination did not apply to incriminating
questions if a judge's answers were used only in a disciplinary
action and not in a criminal action. This case arose when two
judges refused to report about gifts they might have received.
They invoked their fifth amendment right against self-incrimi-
nation. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ruled that the fifth
amendment did not give the judges the right to refuse to report
gifts as long as their answers were not used in criminal pro-
ceedings. In fact, the court ruled, as recommended by the
142 Roy, 349 F Supp. at 321 (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S.
563 (1966)).
,41 See, e.g., McComb v. Supenor Court, 137 Cal. Rptr. 233 (Cal. 1977); In re
"Judge Anonymous," 590 P.2d 1181 (Okla. 1978).
'" See, e.g., Napolitano v. Ward, 457 F.2d 279 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. dented, 409
U.S. 1037 (1972).
141 527 A.2d 997 (Pa. 1987).
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Pennsylvania Judicial Inquiry and Review Board, that failure
to report constituted misconduct calling for removal from of-
fice. Because there had been no prior warning to judges that
they could be removed from office for failing to report gifts,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court gave the judges thirty days to
report, and if they refused, they would be removed from office.
CONCLUSION
When the creation of judicial conduct organizations was
first proposed, it aroused considerable opposition, particularly,
but not exclusively, from judges. The opposition had two main
arguments. The first argument was that it was unnecessary to
establish judicial disciplinary agencies because instances of ju-
dicial misconduct were rare and could be handled adequately
through the existing mechanisms of impeachment, address, or
recall. This assertion ignored the deficiencies of those mechan-
isms and seriously underestimated the frequency of judicial
misconduct. Unfortunately, the judiciary, like the other branches
of government, has not been free from misfeasance, malfea-
sance, and outright corruption. The judiciary has had its share
of villians who have populated the bench at all levels.
While the great majority of judges adhere scrupulously to
ethical norms, the frequency of judicial misbehavior is substan-
tial enough to require systematic regulation of judicial miscon-
duct. This point has been confirmed by experience since the
establishment of judicial conduct organizations. In each of the
last five years over one hundred judges have been found to
have engaged in misconduct 146-a small percentage, perhaps, of
the total number of judges, but certainly enough to be cause
for concern, especially when one considers that other instances
of judicial misconduct go unreported.
The second argument against the creation of judicial con-
duct organizations was that the organizations pose a threat to
judicial independence. In this nation, there has been a long-
146 An annual survey of judicial misconduct case dispositions is published by the
American Judicature Society in the Judicial Conduct Reporter E.g., Begue, Center
Surveys JCO Complaint Disposition, Budget and Staff for 1985, Jur. CONDUCT REP.,
Winter 1987, at 1.
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standing belief in judicial independence so that judges can be
free to decide cases without fear of retribution or the need to
curry favor. Furthermore, judicial independence fosters public
confidence in the courts, which is essential to a legal system
that depends in good part upon voluntary compliance with
judicial decisions. Thus, judicial independence is a cornerstone
of our legal system: the common law rule gives judges absolute
immunity from civil liability for their judicial acts, and the
United States Constitution mandates that federal judges may
not be removed from office except for misbehavior and that
their salaries may not be reduced while they are in office. 147
Because judicial independence is an integral part of our
legal system, the argument that it is threatened by a system of
judicial discipline cannot be dismissed lightly Nevertheless, the
nature of the judicial disciplinary system that has been estab-
lished poses little threat to judicial independence for several
reasons. First, the system operates essentially through judicial
self-regulation. In every state, judges are included in the com-
position of judicial conduct commissions; in some states, judges
constitute a majority of the commission membership. More-
over, commission decisions ordinarily are appealable to a court,
which has the final say as to what constitutes judicial miscon-
duct. With this self-regulation, any threat posed to judicial
independence is greatly diminished.
Second, the system of judicial discipline is designed to
safeguard judicial independence. The Code of Judicial Conduct
expressly states that the integrity and the independence of the
judiciary should be preserved and that the Code should be
construed to further that objective. 148 Modern judicial discipline
is directed at the regulation of activities that should not be and
traditionally have not been considered within the ambit of
judicial independence. For instance, judges have been disci-
plined for harassing litigants or attorneys, for willfully and
persistently failing to perform the duties of their office, for
using the influence of their office to obtain favors for relatives
or for friends, for hearing cases in which they have an interest,
1" U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
1' CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (1972).
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and for committing acts such as deciding cases by the flip of
a coin.
The modern judicial disciplinary system distinctly recognizes
that judges may not be censured or penalized for making er-
roneous or unpopular decisions. The system follows the stan-
dard originated by the Constitution, which protects the
independence of judges "during good behavior ",149 This stan-
dard has been incorporated in the modern judicial discipline
system, which does not permit judicial discipline to be used as
a substitute for appeal or as a means to regulate judges for
rendering mistaken or disfavored decisions.
Given this approach, the judicial disciplinary process can
strengthen judicial independence by bolstering the principle that
judges should not be liable to reprisal merely because their
decisions are wrong or out of favor Admittedly, there is a risk
that this principle will not be faithfully observed and that
discipline will be used improperly to encroach upon judicial
independence. Thus far, however, in the approximately twenty-
five year history of modern judicial discipline, that risk has
come to fruition on only a few occasions. In fact, judicial
retention elections (in those states where they exist) have proven
to be a greater threat to judicial independence than the disci-
plinary system. In the last few years, for example, vigorous
campaigns have been mounted in states such as California,
North Carolina, and Oregon to unseat judges whose decisions
are viewed in some corners as being too "liberal." These cam-
paigns, whether directed at liberal or at conservative judges,
pose a real threat to judicial independence.
It has been twenty-seven years since the creation of the first
permanent judicial conduct commission in California. In that
time, we have seen the rise of a system in the states which has
been able to upgrade the professional conduct of judges. This
upgrading has been accomplished in a fair manner, usually
consistent with due process, and without impinging upon ju-
dicial independence. The establishment of judicial conduct com-
missions has been a successful movement that improves the
quality of the judiciary Commissions began as experiments
"' U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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that, for the most part, have worked well. They have become
an important cog in our system of government.

